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Free Trade in Human Reproductive Cells:




Imagine the frustration of being unable to have a child. The
cause of such disappointment for millions of people is infertility,1
which affects men and women with almost equal frequency.2
Others might not procreate for fear of passing on a genetic
disease or because the woman cannot physically carry a
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S., 2002, Arizona
State University. I would like to thank my friends and family for conveying infinite
support, especially my mother, Teri Hird, who has always been in the front row.
Thanks are also due to my insightful editors.
1. Infertility is medically defined as "the inability to achieve a pregnancy after
twelve months of unprotected intercourse." U.S. National Library of Medicine and
the National Institutes of Health, MEDLINE PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/ency/article/001191.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
2. Approximately ten percent of the global reproductive-age population of
women are unable to become pregnant or carry a pregnancy to term. MARCIA
INHORN & FRANK VAN BALEN, INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON
CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 7 (2003). In the
United States alone, "infertility affects ten percent of Americans of reproductive age
(ages fifteen to forty-five), totaling six million Americans." Helen M. Alvare, The
Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's Rights Perspective, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7 (2003) (citations omitted). Infertility and the risk of
miscarriage also generally increase with age as biological clocks tick away for those
who postpone child rearing to pursue a career, education, or other goals. See Lars
Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 612-13 (2003) ("Infertility represents a
natural consequence of aging, and demographers have noted a trend of deferred
childbearing."). Difficulties in conceiving a child may also be partially attributed to
environmental factors that damage human reproductive systems. See Wayne
Sinclair & Richard W. Pressigner, Environmental Causes of Infertility (Aug. 1998),
http://www.chem-tox.com/infertility/download/InfertilityFacts.pdf. But see Ann
Marie Barako et al., Infertility, WESTFIELD STATE COLLEGE, Nov. 6, 1999,
http://biology.wsc.ma.edu/biology/students/posters/popmodel/infertility (finding
infertility has decreased over time for four out of five age groups of women in the
United States).
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pregnancy to term.3 Some homosexual couples and single adults
also feel the disappointment of being unable to reproduce.4
Desperate to start a family, potential parents sometimes turn to
assisted reproductive technology (ART)," which encompasses
medical procedures such as artificial insemination (also known
as donor insemination (DI))6 and in vitro fertilization (IVF).7 To
use these procedures, some ART patients are required to obtain
viable sperm or eggs from an outside donor.'
Increased reliance on ART compels a greater understanding
of international trade in human gametes9 because laws that
regulate gamete trade profoundly impact the personal lives of
people around the world. Laws that shape this area of supply
and demand are dictated by political, social, and ethical stan-
3. See Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of
Oocyte Donation, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 115 (2001).
4. See, e.g., Women Order Sperm Over the Internet, AUSTRALIAN BROAD.
CORP., July 31, 2000, http://www.abc.net.au/ worldtoday/stories/s151668.htm
[hereinafter Victorian Women]. In the Australian state of Victoria, lesbians and
single women are legally denied access to IVF and sperm donor services. More of
these women are now ordering sperm over the Internet from California sperm banks
and traveling to another state for fertility treatment. See id.
5. Adoption offers another solution, but the demand for healthy American
infants is so great that many individuals choose to adopt children from abroad.
Alison Fleisher, The Decline of Domestic Adoption: Intercountry Adoption as a
Response to Local Adoption Laws and Proposals to Foster Domestic Adoption, 13 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 171, 172-75 (2003). Those who desire a genetic
connection to their child might prefer ART. Id.
6. Artificial insemination requires that donated sperm be introduced into a
woman's uterus to fertilize the woman's egg. Alvare, supra note 2, at 20. The
mother still contributes her genetic material. See id.
7. This procedure requires eggs and sperm to be mixed in a petri dish to
achieve extracorporeal fertilization. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES
26 (March 2004), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports
reproductionandresponsibility [hereinafter President's Council on Bioethics]. One or
more of the embryos, or fertilized eggs, is then transferred into the uterus. Id. at 30.
In 2001, IVF was the most common method of artificial fertilization; it was used by
ninety-nine percent of ART patients. Id. at 26. This procedure requires donated
eggs, donated semen, or both, so the child may or may not be biologically related to
its parents. See Alvare, supra note 2, at 19.
8. Some ART procedures, such as ovarian hyperstimulation, surrogacy, and
the reimplementation of ovaries to postmenopausal women, do not require donor
gametes. Baum, supra note 3, at 114 n.2. Another ART procedure is embryo
donation, in which one or more fertilized eggs containing the genetic material of a
third-party man and woman is implanted in a woman's womb. Although embryos
are also objects of local and global trade, the focus of this Note will be the supply and
demand of gametes for reproductive purposes.
9. Human reproductive cells are referred to as oocytes (eggs) or spermatozoa
(sperm). Eggs and sperm are also called gametes.
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dards that are unique to each country. Some countries impose
strict regulations on donor compensation and anonymity to sat-
isfy ethical concerns over the commodification of human
reproductive cells.1" Some potential parents have circumvented
trade laws by purchasing gametes from less restrictive countries
such as the United States, which has become the leading ex-
porter of human sperm in the world." In effect, certain gamete
trade regulations foster "procreative tourism" 12 as well as illegal
and potentially unhealthy Internet purchases of human sperm
and eggs. 3
This Note explores the global implications of gamete trade
when confronted by ethics-based regulatory schemes. Part I
briefly describes modem demand for human gametes and
various ways that countries regulate the gamete market,
including compensation laws and donor identity laws. This
section also addresses the impact of the Internet on gamete
trade. Part II weighs the costs and benefits of gamete com-
modification and procreative tourism from moral and economic
perspectives. This part also contends that ethics-based laws in-
advertently steer hopeful parents to inconvenient and
potentially unsafe alternative markets. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that an open reproductive market like that of the
United States, with sufficient health regulations and reporting
requirements, will ensure both personal choice and personal
safety for gamete recipients worldwide.
I. TRADE IN HUMAN SPERM AND EGGS
A. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE INCREASING
DEMAND FOR GAMETES
Transferring sperm or eggs from a third party to someone
else for assisted reproductive purposes is not a recent miracle.
DI has been used since the early twentieth century in some
parts of the world. 4 The first successful IVF took place in 1978
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part II.B. and accompanying footnotes.
13. See infra Parts I.C., I.D.
14. Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of
the Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733, 734 n.4 (1994) (citations omitted); Australian
Legislation on Donor Conception, DONOR CONCEPTION SUPPORT GROUP,
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and has since become the "daily bread and butter of the ART
industry.""5 The first conception of a child from eggs donated by
another woman did not occur until five years later. 6 By the
turn of the millennium, approximately five thousand egg trans-
fers a year took place in the United States alone, though not
every transfer resulted in a live birth. 7
Reliance on donor eggs and sperm increased greatly with
advances in reproductive technology. 8 Today, gametes are
capable of being frozen and shipped from one country to another
without damage.' 9 Denmark's largest sperm bank, Cryos Inter-
national, exports to twenty-five countries and emphasizes three
grade qualities of sperm. ° Canada, China, Australia, India, and
many European nations have been known to import gametes,
often because local supply does not meet local needs. China, for
example, is representative of countries that have faced severe
http://members.optushome.com.au/dcsg/legislation/legistlation.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2005). See Ronald S. Jacobs & J. Peter Luedtke, Note, Social and Legal
Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 859, 859-62 (1965);
Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-Baster Babies: The Demedicalization of
Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5 passim (1991).
15. Alvare, supra note 2, at 20. In 1999 approximately 300,000 IVF children
were created in the United States. Id. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention estimates the number of IVF efforts as more than 100,000 a year. Felicia
R. Lee, Driven by Costs, Fertility Clients Head Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005,
at Al. According to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA),
there were approximately twenty-four thousand IVF cycles in the United Kingdom
during the year ending March 2001. Of these treatments, 1,783 used donated eggs,
while 190 used donated embryos. The cumulative result was 465 live births.
Sheridan McCoid, Review: Living: Donation: The Medical Facts, THE OBSERVER,
July 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4644235.
16. See Alvare, supra note 2, at 12.
17. Mary Lydon Shanley, Collaborations and Commodification in Assisted
Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human
Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 257, 264 (2002).
18. See generally Alvare, supra note 2, at 7-8.
19. Gametes can be stored in liquid nitrogen tanks and sent by airfreight.
Sperm sent from California in this manner takes about five to six days to reach New
South Wales, Australia. See Victorian Women, supra note 4. Successfully freezing
eggs, however, remains more difficult than successfully freezing sperm. See Alvare,
supra note 2, at 16.
20. Jim Hightower, Hightower: The Globalization of Sperm Sales (April 26,
2000), http://www.alternet.orgtstory/499. By keeping sperm in liquid-nitrogen
tanks, "[ciryos can deliver to almost any customer in the world within seventy-two
hours." G. Pascal Zachary, Most Likely Industry Finds It Can't Resist
Globalization's Call-Exporting-Human Sperm is a Fast-Growth Business, Banks
in Denmark, U.S. Find, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2000, at Bl. Danish sperm may seem
particularly desirable to parents craving genetic material for blond-haired, blue-eyed
babies. See id.
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problems satisfying "voracious public demand" by means of local
sperm donors.2 ' Many smaller countries, such as Ireland, rely
on sperm imports because local demand is not great enough to
22support a domestic business. Mexico is one exception;
although the government "has not banned sperm imports
outright,.., strict federal standards and restrictions keep
foreign semen out of the country."
23
Demand for human gametes has caused ART to become a
multi-billion dollar industry worldwide.24 The international
sperm supply industry in particular is largely concentrated in
the United States; four of the five largest sperm banks are based
in the United States, and they control an estimated sixty-five
percent of a burgeoning international business believed to be
worth between fifty-million dollars and one-hundred-million
dollars.25 Indeed, Buck Wolf of ABC News once jokingly pro-
claimed: '"hatever economic problems America may have, we
can at least raise our fists and tell the world with pride that we
are the number one exporter of human sperm."26
Although demand is great, only individuals with sufficient
resources can partake in the gamete market. Recipients of ART
often bear its hefty cost alone because few insurance companies
cover fertility treatments, which are viewed as optional.27
21. China's Sperm Banks Face Shortage of Semen Donors, TERRANET, Oct. 19,
2004, http://www.terra.net.lb/wp/Articles/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleId=186425&
ChannellD=19. South China's Guangdong Human Sperm Bank has attracted only
about 350 qualified volunteer donors during its eighteen-month existence. The
author suggests appealing to sperm donors is the main problem, noting strict health
examinations and that "many men are still too shy to arrive at the sperm bank to
donate their sperm." Id.
22. Zachary, supra note 20.
23. Michelle Guevara, Fertile Markets, 12 LATIN TRADE 5, 16 (2004).
24. See generally NANCY SCHEPER-HUGHES & LoIc WACQUANT, COMMODIFYING
BODIES (2002).
25. Id. Within the United States, nineteen semen banks account for
approximately ninety-five percent of the commercial production of donor semen and
earn annual revenue averaging two million dollars per facility. Id. The ninety or so
other semen banks are physician practice-based and generate approximately
$692,000 per year. Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues,
and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,786, 29,819, 29,822
(proposed May 25, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210-11, 820, 1271),
available at httpJ/www.fda.gov/cber/rules/suitdonor.pdf.
26. Buck Wolf, Demand for U.S. Sperm: A Uniquely American Export is
Becoming Popular Overseas, 2003, http://flatrock.org.nz/topics/men/
fertile competition.htm.
27. See generally Dennis A. Hidlebaugh et al., Cost of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies for a Health Maintenance Organization, 42 J. REPROD. MED. 570, 573
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"Thus, as with cosmetic surgery or other elective procedures, pa-
tients assume almost all the costs-creating a market for ser-
vices rather than a planned system for allocating a scarce
resource."2 In the United States approximately fourteen states
mandate insurance coverage of IVF but set qualifications for
provider reimbursement and fertility clinic certification.29
Overall, the estimated cost per patient for ART amounts to
thousands of dollars, depending on the procedure, 0 and yet only
slightly more than thirty-four percent of treatments in the
United States result in clinical pregnancy, with approximately
eighty-three percent of pregnancies resulting in live births.31
For some individuals no price or uncertainty is unreasonable,
even if they must circumvent their country's laws to enlist ser-
vices where gamete trade regulations are more favorable.
B. THE PRICE PAID BY GAMETE DONORS
Donating sperm may seem straightforward and painless.
Men often provide sperm within a relatively short period of time
at a sperm bank or fertility clinic.2 No hormone injections or
professional supervision is necessary, although a complete phy-
sical exam involving further donations of blood, urine, and
semen may be required . Nonetheless male donors incur time,
(1997) ("[IVF] is not a standard benefit in the majority of health insurance programs
except in a few states that have state-mandated laws."); Peter J. Neumann, Should
Health Insurance Cover IVF? 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 1215, 1220 (1997)
(forecasting increased utilization of ART if states mandate insurance coverage).
28. Jeffery Kahn, The Ethics of Egg Donation, MINN. MED., Oct. 1998, at 12.
29. See Baum, supra note 3, at 124-25 nn.48-49 (listing state statutes on the
issue of insurance coverage of IVF procedures). California, for instance, explicitly
rejects coverage of IVF. Id. at n.48; see also Lee, supra note 15.
30. In the United States, the average cost of a single IVF effort is $12,400. Lee,
supra note 15. Successful VF might require several attempts. Id. These high
prices have driven many U.S. women to seek fertility treatment overseas in places
like South Africa, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Germany, and Canada. Id. Though less
expensive, the clinics in foreign countries may not claim of as high a success rate as
U.S. fertility clinics. Id. The vast majority of Americans opt to seek treatment from
the 355 or so IVF centers in the United States. Id.
31. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2002 ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 18-19 (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealtVART02/PDF/ART2002part 1.pdf.
32. Sperm donors are often taken to private rooms and asked to ejaculate their
semen into a sterilized cup. See Alvare, supra note 2, at 10. Afterwards, the donor
gives the cup to an employee of the facility. See id.
33. Id. at 9. Some sperm donors also undergo preliminary interviews and
complete long questionnaires regarding the donor's health, hobbies, and sexual
[Vol. 15:1
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effort, and inconvenience costs.
Obtaining donor eggs is much more difficult. 4 A major dif-
ference between egg and sperm donation is that egg donation
"involves invasive medical treatment for the donor, covering
ovarian stimulation and the... retrieval of mature oocytes un-
der local anesthesia."" Hemorrhaging, infection, and even
death may result, though serious complications are rare.3 6
Women donors also face side effects such as hot flashes, head-
aches, abdominal discomfort, and nausea.37 Furthermore, long-
term complications due to over-stimulating the ovaries and an
increased risk of ovarian cancer pose serious concerns. 3' None-
theless, donor eggs are needed by "women who cannot conceive
using their own eggs, by women at risk of passing on a serious
genetic disease, and most recently by older women, even into the
postmenopausal years."39
While some gamete donors are motivated by an altruistic
desire to help infertile or same-sex couples despite the health
risks of gamete donation, such people tend to be the exception. °
Attracting anonymous donors usually requires financial incen-
tives, especially to persuade egg donors who must endure the
negative aspects of egg extraction.43 Indeed, market supplies re-
orientation among other topics. Id. at 9-10. In some cases, the donor may be
required to give many sperm samples over the course of several days or make a six-
month to one-year commitment to provide samples two to three times per week. Id.
at 10.
34. Throughout this article donor sperm or eggs refers not to a free gift by a
provider, who may be financially compensated in some way, but rather to the human
source, whether living or deceased, of human reproductive cells.
35. P. Baetens et al., Counselling Couples and Donors for Oocyte Donation: The
Decision to Use Either Known or Anonymous Oocytes, 15 HUM. REPROD. No. 2, 476,
476 (2000), http://humrep.oupjournals.orgcgi/content/full/15/2/476. For a more
thorough description of the oocyte donation process, see Baum, supra note 3, at 117-
19.
36. Baum, supra note 3, at 118.
37. See McCoid, supra note 15.
38. See id.
39. Kahn, supra note 28, at 12; see also M. Rosenthal, Oocyte (Egg) Donation,
http://aolsvc.health.webmd.aol.com/content/artcle/41680_51226 (last visited Sept.
15, 2005) (describing women who can benefit from donor eggs).
40. Information on the number of unpaid gamete donors worldwide is sparse.
See McCoid, supra note 15. One source estimates that in Britain there are probably
a few hundred women each year who offer to donate their eggs for purely altruistic
reasons. Jo Revill, IVF Egg Donors 'Risking Their Health'-Experts Call for a Ban
on Donations from Strangers, THE OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 2003, at 6, available at 2003
WL 7092055.
41. See McCoid, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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veal that unpaid women are less willing to endure gamete don-
ation for the benefit of a stranger, which is why egg shortages
are more common in countries that forbid compensation for egg
sales.42
C. RESTRICTIVE TRADE POLICIES EMPLOYED BY FOREIGN
COUNTRIES43 TEND TO INHIBIT GAMETE TRADE
Many people circumvent laws regulating gamete donation
by obtaining donor eggs and sperm from places that allow
greater access to ART resources.44 Knoppers and LeBris coined
the phrase "procreative tourism" to describe "traveling by can-
didate service recipients from one institution, jurisdiction, or
country where treatment is not available to another institution,
jurisdiction, or country where they can obtain the kind of med-
ically assisted reproduction they desire.4 5 Belgium, which has
very little to no regulation of ART, is a prime example of a pro-
creative tourism target.46  In 1999, sixty percent of all patients
requesting oocyte donation in Belgium were foreigners.
47
1. Foreign Laws Restrict Compensation for Sperm and Egg
42. Pip Morris of the National Gamete Donation Trust estimates that, on
average, couples in the United Kingdom wait about two years to receive donated
eggs. See Phil Corrigan, Women Asked to Donate Eggs to Help the Childless, THE
SENTINEL, Aug. 31, 2004, at 7, available at 2004 WLNR 2078342. One explanation
is that clinics do not have the time or money to launch recruitment campaigns. See
id. Admittedly, the relationship between gamete shortages and capped
compensation is based on circumstantial evidence rather than a proven direct
correlation. Kenneth Baum acknowledges there may be other factors, such as local
social norms and religious beliefs, to explain a low number of gamete donors where
payment is regulated. However, like Mr. Baum, I will proceed based on the logic
and evidence that gamete supply is affected by financial incentives. See Baum,
supra note 3, at 158-60 ("The empirical evidence is clear: supply does not meet
demand when donor compensation is regulated.").
43. This article will mainly focus on gamete trade restrictions within Europe,
Canada, and to some extent Australia due to availability of data.
44. See G. Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion, 28 J.
MED. ETHIcs 337, 337 (2002).
45. Id. (citing B.M. Knoppers & S. LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically
Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 329-
61 (1991)).
46. Pennings, supra note 44, at 338. As noted later, Belgium does regulate
some aspects of ART, such as restricting donor compensation to reasonable
expenses. However, unlike other countries, Belgium does not discriminate on the
basis of a recipient's sexuality, age, or marital status. This might explain why
Belgium's ART services are in such high demand. See infra Part I.C.1.
47. Pennings, supra note 44, at 338.
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Donation
Ethical concerns about the exploitation of potential donors
and commodification of human reproductive cells have moti-
vated several countries to limit or otherwise regulate financial
reimbursements to donors. On March 31, 2004, the European
Union (EU) issued a directive to all Member States that they
may "introduce requirements for voluntary and unpaid dona-
tion, which include the prohibition or restriction of imports of
human tissues and cells to ensure a high level of health pro-
tection."4 As of April 7, 2006, countries of the EU must ensure
that procurement of tissues and cells will be carried out on a
non-profit basis with compensation limited to the donor's rea-
sonable expenses.49 The Directive goes one step further by regu-
lating publicity: advertising availability of or the need for
human tissues and cells for financial gain is now prohibited.50
Several European countries have already taken steps to-
wards compliance with the EU directive. In the United
Kingdom, rules set by the Human Fertilization and Embryology
Authority (HFEA)51 provide that donors can only be reimbursed
48. Council Directive 2004123, art. 4, On Setting Standards of Quality and
Safety for the Donation, Procurement, Testing, Processing, Preservation, Storage
and Distribution of Human Tissues and Cells, 2004 O.J. (L 102) 52 (EU) [hereinafter
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council]. "Tissues and cells"
includes reproductive cells (eggs, sperm). See id. art. 3 (a)-(b). Ruth Deech argues
that the EU directive, which allows members to prohibit gamete imports, conflicts
with the Treaty of Rome, which prohibits restrictions on imports or exports between
European countries except when prohibitions are justified on "grounds of public
morality, public policy or public security, the protection of health and life." Ruth
Deech, Reproductive Tourism in Europe: Infertility and Human Rights, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE No. 4, 425, 428 (2003). Human gametes and embryos, especially when
they are gathered as part of a commercial profit-making enterprise, probably
constitute "goods" for the purposes of the Treaty of Rome. Id. Therefore, as a
general rule, importing countries must accept the validity of sperm and egg
screening in the exporting state unless the importing country can establish
inadequate gamete screening and testing. Id. ("Quantitative restrictions on imports
and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following
provisions, be prohibited between Member States.").
49. "Member States shall endeavor to ensure voluntary and unpaid donations
of tissues and cells. Donors may receive compensation, which is strictly limited to
making good the expenses and inconveniences related to the donation. In that case,
Member States define the conditions under which compensation may be granted."
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, supra note 48, at art. 12.
50. See id.
51. HFEA is a UK governmental body that regulates and inspects all UK
clinics providing IVF, DI or the storage of eggs, sperm or embryos. See Deech, supra
note 48, at 425-26.
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for expenses, despite the fact that monetary compensation
might entice British sperm donations, which have declined
nearly sixty percent in the past ten years.2 Although Belgium
does not regulate ART specifically, most fertility centers will
only allow donors to be reimbursed for personal expenses due to
Article 1128 of the Civil Code, which states that bodies or parts
thereof cannot be the object of a sales agreement.53
Countries outside of the EU also impose limits on gamete
donors' compensation. Effective April 22, 2004, Canada's Assis-
ted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA) makes it illegal to pur-
chase human gametes from donors except for reasonable reim-
54bursement of expenses. This law might correlate with
Canada's ongoing decrease in human sperm and egg supplies. 5
Australia also prohibits the sale of human reproductive
material,56 while Israel limits payment to expenses the donor
incurred by donating.
57
52. Richard Willing, U.S. Sperm Banks to Give Gift of Life to the U.K., USA
TODAY, Aug. 14, 2002, at 2A.
53. See Baetens et al., supra note 35, at 476 (citing Belgian Civil Code 1128).
54. Receipted expenditures include medical costs and other physical care
expenses, including medication, gas and maternity clothes, but exclude payment for
time away from work and family, or medical risk or inconvenience. See Assisted
Human Reproduction Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 2, 5 (Can.).; Louisa Taylor, Making Law for
Making Babies, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL 12874009; see
also Canada Health Online, http:www.hc-sc.gc.ca/indexe.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2005).
55. Canadians spent $1.5 million to import "human glands and secretions" to
Canada during the first nine months of 2000. Wolf, supra note 26. Xytex, a leading
U.S. semen trade company, has met the demand by trading in Canada, as well as in
several countries in Europe. For more information, visit http://www.xytex.com,
where potential recipients can search for sperm donors by hair color, eye color,
ethnic origin, blood type, height, weight, and religion. Site subscribers can view
donor photographs. Xytex Corp. Homepage, http://www.xytex.com (last visited Sept.
15, 2005).
56. The Human Reproductive Technology Act governs Western Australia.
South Australia enacted its own Prohibition of Human Cloning Act (PHCA), which
makes commercial trade in human eggs, human sperm, or human embryos an
offense with a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment. Prohibition of Human
Cloning Act, 2003, pt. 2, div. 2(19), S. AUSTL. STAT., available at
http://www.parliament.sa.gov.au/Catalog/legislation/Acts/P/2003.17.htm.
57. The Ministry of Health oversees fertility practices by limiting donor
eligibility and compensation. Baum, supra note 3, at 129 (citing Judy Siegel, Groups
Voice Support for Liberalizing Ova Donations, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 2, 2000, at 4).
India does not seem to restrict compensation for egg donors. Rotunda Sperm Bank,
one of India's largest sperm banks, advertises online for egg donors, stating, "We
will be happy to pay generously for your generosity." See I Wanna Get Pregnant,
http://www.iwannagetpregnant.com/wanted.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
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2. Donor Anonymity
When friends or family members are utilized as gamete
donors,58 recipients typically know the names59 of their children's
biological parent(s) and vice versa. When the third-party donor
is a stranger, however, donors may only offer to contribute their
genetic material if they may do so anonymously. Other donors
will permit their identity to be disclosed to the gamete
recipient(s) and/or child conceived through ART. This decision
is obviously personal and may have lasting repercussions for all
parties involved.
Anonymous gamete donation can be beneficial to both
donors and recipients. There is some indication that laws requi-
ring donors to disclose their identities tend to discourage gamete
donation.6 ' Additionally, donors might prefer anonymity to
avoid legal obligations or future contact with the child, the ga-
mete recipient, or both.6' From a psychological perspective,
gamete recipients might prefer anonymity to alleviate the sense
of debt to the donor and allow the recipients to "construct their
own parental status."62 Although the donor has a genetic att-
achment to the child, he might consider the gamete recipient the
58. For instance, in a study conducted by the Centre for Reproductive Medicine
of the Free University of Brussels, the majority of egg donors were friends (35.4%) or
sisters (27.7%) of the recipient women. Baetens et al., supra note 35. Despite
obvious trends, the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine cautions against the use of family members as gamete donors and
surrogates. Assisted Reproductive Technology; Ethics Committee Reports on Family
Members as Gamete Donors and Surrogates, WOMEN'S HEALTH WKLY, Dec. 18, 2003,
at 12, available at 2003 WL 8995625 (warning against the "appearance of incest or
consanguinity, confused ideas of parentage for the resulting children, and undue
pressure on family members to participate.").
59. For purposes of this Note, a donor is anonymous when the donor's name
and identifying information are not disclosed to the gamete recipient or ART-
conceived child. General characteristics of the donor, such as eye color, blood type
and race, may be disclosed while maintaining the donor's anonymity.
60. Such has been the case in the Netherlands, where Dutch women facing a
two-year wait list at Dutch sperm banks are now asking friends for sperm, buying
sperm over the Internet, or applying for sperm donations in Belgium, where sperm
donors have a choice to remain anonymous or be identified. Geraldine Coughlan,
Dutch Law Sparks Sperm Shortage, BBC NEWS (The Hague), June 2, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/world/europe/3769029.stm; see Baetens et al.,
supra note 35, at 476-77.
61. See Mary Louise et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 94 n.280 (1998).
62. Baetens et al., supra note 35, at 477 (citing A. Raoul-Duval, et al.,
Anonymous Oocyte Donation: A Psychological Study of Recipients, Donors and
Children, 7 HuM. REPROD. 51, 51-54 (1992)).
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true parent because the recipient actually carried, gave birth to,
and raised the child.
Outside the United States, it has become increasingly com-
mon for the decision concerning anonymity to be imposed by law
rather than left to donors and recipients. A recent EU Directive
states that the identity of the recipient(s) should not be "disclo-
sed to the donor or his family and vice versa, without prejudice
to legislation in force in Member States on the conditions of dis-
closure, notably in the case of gamete donation."63 Recent trends
in European domestic legislation, however, override the EU
directive and penetrate anonymity by allowing genetic offspring
to trace their biological parent. Dutch sperm centers, for
instance, can no longer accept anonymous donations, and
children conceived from a donation are legally entitled to their
fathers' identities when they reach sixteen years of age.6 4
Citizens of Great Britain who donate after April 1, 2005, will no
longer be able to remain anonymous once the conceived child
reaches eighteen years old.65 Other countries have implemented
similar standards.66
Proponents of donor identification argue that ART-
conceived children benefit from knowing their donors' names.
63. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, supra note 48,
art. 14.
64. Coughlan, supra note 60.
65. See Corrigan, supra note 42; Kate Leason, Potential Sperm Donors May Be
Turned Off by Lack of Anonymity, COMMUNITY CARE, Jan. 29, 2004, at 16, available
at 2004 WL 65354388. In order to help the transition from anonymous to
identifiable donors, British government policy is that clinics will be able to use
donations made anonymously before April 1, 2005 in treatment up to March 31,
2006. National Gamete Donation Trust, Donation and the Law,
http://www.ngdt.co.uk/donation law.php?section=default (last visited Sept. 15,
2005).
66. Sweden, Canada, Germany, New Zealand and Australia have "moved
toward greater openness" regarding donor identity, although several countries
restrict information so that the exact donor cannot be identified. Shanley, supra
note 17, at 273-74; NAT'L ETHICS COMM. ON ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION,
GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF EMBRYO DONATION FOR REPRODUCTIVE
PURPOSES: CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 8 (2004), available at http:l!
www.newhealth.govt.nz/necahr/files/EmbryoDonation.pdf; DONOR CONCEPTION
SUPPORT GROUP, supra note 14 (stating that within Australia, only the state of
Victoria gives children the right to know the identity of their donor(s) when they
reach the age of eighteen, and only if conception occurred after January 1998).
France, on the contrary, requires compulsory "personalized anonymity." See
Pennings, supra note 44, at 340 (quoting A. Rauol-Duval et al., Les Enfants Du Don
D'ovocytes Anonyme Personnalise. Aspects Psychologiques, 20 J. DE GYNECOLOGIE,
OBSTETRIE ET BIOLOGIE DE REPRODUCTION 317-20 (1991)).
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First, children have a psychological need to know their "true"
identity so far as genetics are concerned . From a sociological
perspective, "[s]tipulating that the provider's name can be dis-
closed at the request of the grown child precludes imagining the
child as the genetic offspring of 'nobody' or of 'anybody'. 68 There
are also practical benefits for cultural groups that emphasize
being able to trace a person's exact genetic lineage.6 9
Additionally, children might have a better chance of discovering
their biological parents' medical history. In these respects,
advocates of donor identification expect ART children to have
the same right to information as adopted children 70 Further-
more, most recipient couples seem to prefer knowing the donors'
identities .
3. Maximum Number of Live Births Per Donor and Other
Obstacles to Gamete Purchase
Some countries restrict the maximum number of children
that a sperm donor can sire in order to prevent the possibility of
67. "It is the person who comes into being that has the right to know the
identity of the provider, not the adult recipients of the genetic material." Shanley,
supra note 17, at 268.
68. Id. at 268-69.
69. See generally Bernard M. Dickens, Ethical Issues Arising From the Use of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, in CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONTROVERSIES IN
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: REPORT OF A WHO MEETING 333 (Effy Vayena et al. eds.,
2001), available at http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/ infertility/31pdf.
Culture impacts the use of ART. For instance, Middle Eastern Muslim societies
expect married couples to produce biological children. Assisted Reproduction:
Religion Guides Views of Fertility Treatment in the Middle East, HEALTH & MED.
WK., March 8, 2004, at 49, available at 2004 WL 71004795. Sunni Islam states that
IVF is allowed, but the couple may only use their own gametes. Id. On the other
hand, Shi'ite Muslim husbands may be required to do a muta'a, or temporary
marriage with an egg donor, to ensure the child is not born out of wedlock. Id.
70. See Sperm Donors to Lose Anonymity, BBC NEWS, Jan. 21, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1]hi/health/3414141.stm (supporting HFEA's decision to revoke
gamete donors' anonymity and quoting Health Minister Melanie Johnson, who
stated that "donor-conceived people should not be treated so differently from adopted
people.").
71. In a study conducted at the Centre for Reproductive Medicine of the Free
University of Brussels, 68.8% of 144 couples preferred to use eggs from a known
donor as opposed to anonymous donation. Baetens et al., supra note 35, at 476.
Almost one-third of the couples chose anonymous donation, however, to "establish
boundaries between the two families involved." Id. Couples who chose known
donors wanted to "avoid fears associated with anonymity, such as fear of the origin
of unknown genetic material and the trust that couples had in 'their' donor." Id.
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accidental incest by unknowing half-siblings. In Britain the
number is ten live births, in Denmark the limit is twenty-five,
and in France, five. 7' The impact of these laws is unclear.
Future researchers may reveal the number of sperm donors who
have been turned away after having sired the legal limit of chil-
dren.
Aside from sire quotas, some countries impose additional
safeguards. A new law in Italy bans sperm and egg donations
and limits AI to married, heterosexual couples that demonstrate
a stable relationship. Other countries mandate counseling for
the donor and recipient to curtail potential psychological impact
and ensure both parties express informed consent. 75  French
patients must travel outside their country to use fresh eggs
versus frozen gametes.6 Additionally:
Other streams of patients come from Germany, where neither oocyte
donation nor IVF with donor sperm is allowed; from the Netherlands
because of a maximum age limit for the recipient and because
surgically obtained sperm cannot be used, and from France where
lesbian couples and single women are denied access to assisted
reproduction and where female recipients must be of "reproductive
age. 77
72. Deech, supra note 48, at 428-29.
73. See id.
74. Italy Fertility Treatment Curbed, BBC NEWS, Mar. 9, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/3545421.stm. The author predicts some
Italian fertility clinics will relocate to neighboring countries. See also Italy Bans
Donor Sperm and Eggs, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/Europe/311031.stm; Robin Marantz Henig, On High-Tech Reproduction, Italy
Will Practice Abstinence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, http://query.nytimes.coml
gst/health/article-printpage.html?res=9C01EFDE173FF931A357.
75. One report indicates that "occasional" egg donors are psychologically fragile
women looking for recognition or massive self-repair. Baetens et al., supra note 35,
at 476 (citing Englert, Ethics of Oocyte Donation Are Challenged By the Health Care
System, 11 HuM. REPROD. 2353, 2353-55 (1996)). Therefore, "extensive and careful
psychological screening of potential donors is proposed in all cases." Baetens et al.,
supra note 35, at 473 (citing Collins A. Kennard et al., A Program For Matched,
Anonymous Oocyte Donation, 51 FERTILITY STERILITY 655-60 (1989)). See generally
Reis L. Schover et al., The Psychological Evaluation of Oocyte Donors, 11 JOURNAL
OF PSYCHOSOMETRIC OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 299-309 (1990)).
76. Pennings, supra note 44, at 338. Freezing of embryos typically reduces the
success rate. Id.
77. Id. Recently, a sixty-six year old Romanian woman became pregnant
through IVF using egg and sperm from an anonymous donor. See Romania: Mother,
66, and Baby Doing Well, NY TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A8. She delivered a baby
weighing three pounds, three ounces. Id. A law has been drafted in the Romanian
Par-liament banning fertility treatment for women above "normal reproductive age."
Id.
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These hurdles limit free commerce within one's country and
drive potential parents to alternative gamete markets.
D. U.S. REGULATIONS EMBRACE OPEN GAMETE TRADE
The United States regulates certain aspects of human egg
and sperm use. Human cloning experimentation, for instance,
is explicitly prohibited on ethical grounds. 79 Also, the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) recently passed regulations "to
screen and test cell and tissue donors for risk factors for, and
clinical evidence of, relevant communicable disease agents and
diseases." 80 Effective May 25, 2005, these measures establish
minimum health standards to promote public confidence in U.S.
medical agencies and clinics using ART. 8' Interestingly, most if
not all U.S. clinics are already in compliance with impending
FDA health regulations, even though rules the individual clinics
presently employ are often based on voluntary guidelines pro-
posed by professional organizations. 2 Market incentives, such
as a favorable business reputation, have already achieved the
desired result: disease-free gametes.
Unlike the laws of foreign nations, however, U.S. federal
laws do not address general social and economic practices of
gamete donation such as donor anonymity, compensation, maxi-
mum children per donor, and other limitations. Instead, courts
continue to recognize reproductive autonomy as a fundamental
right with which the government must not interfere absent com-
78. See generally Pennings, supra note 44.
79. On June 9, 1997, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC)
issued a report concluding that human cloning is "morally unacceptable." See NAT'L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS 1 (1997). The NBAC
recommended that President Clinton continue withholding federal funds from such
research. See id. at 109; Shawn E. Peterson, A Comprehensive National Policy to
Stop Human Cloning: An Analysis of the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001
With Recommendations for Federal and State Legislatures, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POLY 217, 218 (2003).
80. Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular
and Tissue-Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg., 29,789 (proposed May 25, 2004) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 210-11, 820, 1271).
81. FDA analysts believe that all semen banks perform HIV screening. Id. at
29,819. Additionally, the twenty largest semen banks already followed American
Association of Tissue Banks (AATB) proposed guidelines for screening and testing.
Id. Implementation costs of the new FDA regulations will have the greatest impact
on small semen banks, which typically function as a side business within a
physician's fertility practice. Id.
82. See Kahn, supra note 28, at 12.
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pelling justification. 3 As this Note will explain, the lack of ex-
acting regulations in the United States facilitates gamete trade,
unlike the regulations of European and other countries that eff-
ectively limit trade and compel potential parents to obtain
gametes elsewhere.
Where no state or federal regulation is in place, individual
clinics are left to decide factors such as recipient age limits, the
number of donations per donor, donor advertisement content,
and the price for "donations." Most state statutes directly conc-
erning ART address whether and to what extent ART will be
covered by insurance benefits.84 A handful of states actually re-
gulate the business and medical practice of ART. Louisiana and
Florida, for example, forbid the exchange of money for gametes
or embryos,'5 while Virginia explicitly allows such sales."6 In re-
gards to gamete and embryo recipient qualifications, only New
Hampshire statutorily imposes age and health requirements .
7
Whether states or the federal government will impose additional
or more stringent rules is unknown."5
83. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding procreation
involves an intimate and personal choice "central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(asserting that one's decision whether or not to bear a child is part of the right to
privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing right to access
contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (characterizing marriage
and procreation as "basic civil rights"). Assisted reproduction might also be less
regulated in the United States because of the political divide over abortion, stem cell
research, and other controversial medical practices involving human embryos. See
Elizabeth Olson, Bioethics Panel Recommends Limits on Assisted Fertility, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 2, 2004, at A15.
84. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 7, at ch. 2 (providing
summary of state oversight of ART).
85. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 873.05 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 9:122, 9:130
(2000). Louisiana has the highest level of protection for human embryos of all the
U.S. jurisdictions according to the President's Council on Bioethics. PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 7, at ch. 2.
86. See VA. CODE. ANN §§ 32.1-289.1 (2004) (exempting "ova" from ban on sale
of body parts).
87. Alvare, supra note 2, at 30-31 n.216 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-
B:13 (2001), which allows IVF or pre-embryo transfers only for women twenty-one
years of age or older). As noted above, however, sperm banks and infertility clinics
have voluntarily complied with health guidelines in the absence of state legislation.
88. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) is considered one
of the key sources of nongovernmental guidance for the practice of ART. See
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 7, at ch. 2. However, ART
practitioners' decisions to comply with ASRM's published statements, opinions, and
guidelines is entirely voluntary. Id. As another source of guidance, the President's
Council on Bioethics issued a report last year addressing assisted reproduction.
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1. U.S. Compensation Opportunities and Ethical Issues
In the United States, women are paid on average $5,000 to
$8,000 per egg donation episode.89 Men receive between $25 and
$50 per sperm donation. 90 In an economy driven by financial
incentives, however, a donor with desirable traits can command
a much higher premium. One wealthy couple offered $50,000 to
an Ivy League egg donor who was 5'10" and scored at least 1400
on her SAT college entrance exams.9' A "Nobel Prize sperm
bank" for parents who desire ultra-intelligent children also
sparked dreams of profitability.
92
Treating gametes as commodities with negotiable prices has
Susan M. Wolf, Law & Bioethics: From Values to Violence, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
293, 299 (2004) (citing PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 7). First, the
Council recommended that Congress should amend federal statutes to encourage
clinics to report assisted reproduction by imposing penalties on clinics which fail to
report. Id. Second, the Council advised that professional societies create
enforcement mechanisms to force compliance with ethics and practice guidelines.
Id. Third, and most troubling to Professor Wolf, is the Council's proposal that
Congress enact eight prohibitions on practices and research relating to ART. Id.
One of these proposals is to prohibit the buying and selling of human embryos with
an exception for reimbursement of reasonable expenses. Id. The Council qualifies
this proposal in a footnote:
[Blecause the compensated giving of sperm is a long-established practice,
and because payment to egg donors is now also fairly common, efforts to
ban payment to gamete providers would likely prove controversial and
untenable for purposes of actual legislation. Thus, we decline to
recommend such a ban here... [although] many Council members have
raised serious concerns regarding this species of commercialization in the
domain of human reproduction.
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 7, at ch. 10, n.ix.
89. Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage:
Economic Incentives for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 213, 218
(2001) (citations omitted). Another source estimates average compensation for egg
donors to range between $2,500 and $3,000. See M. P. Rosenthal, Oocyte (Egg)
Donation, WEBMD (Oct. 25, 2004), http://aolsvc.health.webmd.aol.com/content/
article/4/1680_51226. No source pegged average egg donor compensation to be less
than $1000.
90. But see Jennifer Wolff, Sperm Donor Ruling Could Open Door for Offspring,
USA TODAY, June 15, 2004, at 13A. ("Other sources estimate sperm donor payments
to average $50 to $75 a 'shot.' Sperm banks.., can divide a single ejaculate into
four to six ampuls of marketable sperm that sell for as much as $300 each.").
91. Christopher Hammond, For All We're Worth, ENDEAVORS (Winter 2000),
http://research.unc.edu/endeavors/win2000/medical_ethics.htm.
92. Robert Graham, a millionaire inventor, created the "Nobel Prize sperm
bank." David Plotz Post, The Rise of the Smart Sperm Shopper, SLATE, Apr. 20,
2001, http://slate.msn.com/id/104633. Graham's sperm bank helped to produce more
than 200 children, although not a single baby was conceived from the sperm of a
Nobel Prize laureate. Id.
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stirred ethical concerns in the United States.93 It is argued that
treating derivatives of the body like any other good "belittles the
human existence."94 Others contend that gametes should not be
sold for the same reasons that bodily organs are not sold on the
open market: poor individuals will be compelled to donate for
the sake of money without weighing the consequences of their
decision.95
However, Kenneth Baum argues that the potential reasons
to regulate egg donor compensation are outweighed by free
alienability.96 According to Baum, the policy rationales for the
legal ban on the sale of transplant organs-such as life-or-death
urgency-are highly speculative and not relevant to the human
egg context.97 Furthermore, Baum suggests that banning com-
pensation is wrong because it creates a situation of scarcity by
erecting barriers to gamete access.98 Accordingly, donor com-
pensation is the only way to protect "procreative liberty."99
93. See Baum, supra note 3, at 134-35. Margaret Jane Radin, an "outspoken
opponent of universal commodification of the human body," once wrote:
In our understanding of personhood we are committed to an ideal of
individual uniqueness that does not cohere with the idea that each person's
attributes are fungible, that they have a monetary equivalent, and that
they can be traded off against those of other people. Universal market
rhetoric... reduces the conception of a person to an abstract, fungible unit
with no individuating characteristics.
Id. at 134 nn.87, 89 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987)).
94. Baum, supra note 3, at 134.
95. See id.; Shanley, supra note 17, at 271-72 ("[S]ome parts of the body should
not be for sale either because of the significance of reserving aspects of the human
body from commodification, or because economic need might lead poor people to sell
body parts.").
96. Baum, supra note 3, at 162. Baum's arguments are also applicable to the
sale of human sperm.
97. Id. at 144.
98. Id. at 150-51.
99. See id. Baum explains,
[Pirocreative liberty maintains that all individuals should have the right to
decide whether or not to exploit their reproductive capacity and that,
absent strong justification for limiting this right, such as clearly
identifiable and tangible harms, they should have at their disposal all
possible means of effectuating that choice. This is so because the decision
whether or not to create is so fundamental, so personal, that its denial
would be antithetical to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness.
Id. at 113 (emphasis added) (citing generally JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994)); see also
John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human
Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1989). In this manner, procreative liberty
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Soliciting unpaid gamete donors through mass advertising
might help to end gamete compensation. Just as blood donors
are honored for their selfless contributions, so should charitable
egg and sperm donors feel appreciated. 1°' Others advocate cap-
ped payments to donors-a standard and consistent monetary
incentive to encourage altruism.1 1 Alternatively, Dr. Jeffery
Kahn, Director of the University of Minnesota Center for Bio-
ethics, argues that donations should be allocated based on med-
ical need and waiting time, much as solid organs are allocated
for transplantation.
2. Choice of Donor Anonymity in the United States' Open
Reproductive Market
Disclosure of donor identity is not regulated in the United
States, leaving the decision of anonymity up to sperm banks,
fertility clinics, and those who use their services. 1 ' Most U.S.
sperm banks choose to make donors anonymous."4 Sometimes
outlets provide identity-release programs by which the donor
may later be contacted by potential children. 1 5 Even then legal
rights and responsibilities of fatherhood or motherhood do not
106
attach unless the donor intended such consequences.
is a negative right-the right to be free from governmental interference. Id. at 113-
14.
100. See Press Release, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Paid
Egg Sharing to be Regulated, Not Banned (Dec. 10, 1998),
http://www.hefa.gov.uk/PressOffice/Archive/Paideggsharingtoberegulatednotbanned
("The HFEA believes that the donation of sperm or eggs to create new life should be
a gift, freely and voluntarily given."); see also Walter Merrick, Comment & Analysis:
Why Sperm Donors Must Step Forward, GUARDIAN, Apr. 21, 2004, at 24, available at
WL 75661048.
101. Kahn, supra note 28.
102. Id.
103. Wolff, supra note 90.
104. See id.
105. See id. "Some outlets, such as the Sperm Bank of California, offer identity-
release programs that permit offspring to seek contact information about their
biological fathers when they turn 18. Id. Others, such as California Cryobank in
Los Angeles, offer to contact the donor on the offspring's behalf to see whether the
father is willing to share more information about himself, or to meet his child. Id.
But again, this offer is made only after the child turns 18, the legal age of
emancipation, when rights of the parent-biological or otherwise-are considered
terminated." Id.
106. In a recent case, Brock v. Kepl, the Washington Court of Appeals
interpreted a state statute to mean that sperm donors escape the legal obligations of
natural paternity unless the donor and female recipient signed a specific contract
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Unsurprisingly, portions of the U.S. sperm and egg industry
flourish due to lack of donor secrecy, as fertile individuals
supply personal photographs, educational background, and
family medical history in hopes of attracting buyers. 17 For in-
stance, the New England Cryogenic Center (NECC) requests a
family health history dating back three generations, a r6sum6,
college grade point average, a three-page questionnaire on life
goals, hobbies, TV and movie preferences, head-on and profile
photos, and even favorite colors and flavors of ice cream. 18 Pro-
viding these details to clients has helped make NECC "North
America's largest, full-service" sperm bank, shipping specimens
to over twenty-eight countries.!
3. No Sire Quotas in the United States
No U.S. governmental entity has ever imposed sire quotas
to prevent inadvertent incest. Doctors have taken advantage of
this regulation vacuum. According to a survey conducted in
1977, fertility doctors in the United States admitted to using the
same donor repeatedly, sometimes fifteen or more times."' An
incredible case surfaced in 1992 when Dr. Cecil Jacobson, who
ran his own fertility clinic in Virginia, was convicted of multiple
counts of fraud for inseminating clients with his own sperm."'
DNA tests later revealed that Dr. Jacobson fathered at least fif-
saying the donor will be the natural father. 121 Wash. App. 578, 89 P.3d 309 (App.
Ct. 2004). In Brock the married defendant did not have to pay child support, even
though he donated sperm to his girlfriend. Id. (interpreting former Washington
statute RCW 26.26.050(2)); see also Jonathan Martin, Sperm Donor is Not Liable for
Children, SEAITLE TIMES, May 7, 2004, at Al.
107. Willing, supra note 52. U.S. gamete brokers and private suppliers tend to
advertise numerous personal details except the donor's name and identifying
information, which typically remains confidential. Id. Potential parents flock to
this system when they want to know as much about the genetic material being
passed on to their child as possible. Id. In all practical respects, the donor's name
seems irrelevant. Id.
108. See id.
109. See NECC's website, http'/www.necryogenic.com, for more information.
110. Shanley, supra note 17, at 262. Doctors selected the providers, who were
usually medical students, other university students, or hospital personnel. Id. at
261-62. The survey revealed that many doctors admitted to using a provider for no
more than six pregnancies, although 5.7% had used a provider for fifteen or more.
Id.
111. Associated Press, Fertility Doctor Sued for Using Wrong Sperm,
MSNBC.News, July 15, 2004, http://www.msnbc.com/id/5442808.
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teen of his patients' children,'12 and some estimates range as
high as seventy-five." 3 His sentence included time in prison.114
If it is true that some men donate sperm several times a
week over extended periods of time,"15 a single donor may be
responsible for more children than Dr. Jacobson fathered. Con-
sider the impact of U.S. sperm exports; with no limit to the
number of children beget by a single man, it may be possible to
sire dozens of children across multiple continents. Difficulty in
tracking the number of live births across such a wide geographic
area might explain the futility of imposing sire quotas to avoid
incest.
E. THE INTERNET
The Internet places global ART at one's fingertips."6
Potential parents can surf through a vast range of egg and
sperm donors from around the world."7  "Gamete entrepre-
neurs" are readily found through Internet chat rooms and self-
promoting advertisements. 118  Websites also have the potential
of reaching a greater number of people within a target
population; for instance, the controversial website
ManNotIncluded.com focuses on selling "mail-order sperm" to
112. See id.
113. Cecil Jacobson, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 16, 1992, at 18.
114. See id. Federal or state regulation of repeat donors may not be needed so
long as medical malpractice, fraud, and other criminal and civil penalties await
dishonest fertility practitioners like Dr. Jacobson.
115. See Alvare, supra note 2 (regarding requirement of multiple semen
donations by some labs).
116. See Connie Guglielmo, Editorial, The Messanine May Be Closed for
Merchants, 5 INTER@CTIVE WEEK 44, Feb. 9, 1998 (highlighting the fact that sperm
can be purchased over the Web, which has created a "global marketplace that makes
an array of goods.., readily available to cybershoppers.").
117. One example of an Internet agency involved in gamete sales is the London-
based Internet service WomenNotIncluded.com, which profits from the EU payment
ban by charging British women who are determined to search for gametes abroad.
Isabel Oakeshott, Human Eggs for Sale on the Net, EVENING STANDARD, Feb. 2,
2004, http://www.thisislondon.com/news/articles/9287505?source=EveningStandard.
John Gonzales, who launched WomenNotIncluded.com, boasts that the website will
"increase the global egg pool, clearing a vast backlog of eager, yet deprived women
and reducing a waiting time of three to five years to mere weeks." Id.
118. Websites, such as http://www.ronsangels.com, advertise online egg and
sperm auctions where people from around the world can bid for the eggs of
"struggling supermodels" for around $30,000 with $1000 bid increments. See Baum,
supra note 3.
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single women and lesbian couples."9
Internet trade in human gametes elicits several dangers.
Because most countries' regulatory authority specifically ex-
tends to infertility clinics but not the Internet, there is an
absence of regulation to ensure quality management of Internet
gamete vendors.120 Thus, consumers assume the risks of false
advertising and disease-carrying gametes. 2 ' Legal claims such
as false advertising and breach of contract are further comp-
licated by international transactions.' 22
People in countries where trade in gametes is highly reg-
ulated may use the Internet to bypass local laws. For example,
as of the year 2000, lesbian and single women were denied ac-
cess to IVF and sperm donor services under the laws of Victoria,
Australia. 23 As a result, these women often ordered sperm over
the Internet from California sperm banks and traveled to New
South Wales, Australia, for fertility treatment.' 24 Without sanc-
tions for evading the regulation, Victoria's laws have little effect
on some gamete cybershoppers. One can imagine similar con-
duct by Internet savvy donees worldwide.
II. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GAMETE
COMMODIFICATION AND PROCREATIVE TOURISM FROM
MORAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
Gamete regulations that impact trade may be sorted into
three categories. First, some countries enact laws that impede
the acquisition of human gametes from donors, thus reducing
the supply available for ART. These "supply hindrance" laws in-
clude compensation restrictions, anonymity preclusion laws, and
. 125
sire quotas. The second category consists of regulations that
obstruct access to reproductive cells. These "recipient dis-
crimination" laws disqualify potential recipients based on their
119. See id.
120. At least in Great Britain, governmental powers are limited because website
companies are not subject to the same regulations as infertility clinics. See id.
121. Guglielmo, supra note 116. The lure of money might induce some
individuals to not disclose their true medical history and donate sperm or eggs that
could harm or even kill the potential recipient. Baum, supra note 3, at 140.
122. For instance, which country's laws should apply? Criminal or civil? Which
court has jurisdiction and in what venue?
123. See Victorian Women, supra note 4.
124. See id.
125. See supra Part I.C.
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social identity or traits such as homosexuality, age, or marital
status.126 The third category, mandatory health regulations, im-
pacts trade by excluding clinics that fail to meet safety stand-
ards.127 Health regulations also restrict providers from perform-
ing certain ART procedures or using certain types of gametes. 28
All three types of gamete regulations have the potential to
force gamete seekers to peruse foreign markets. An absence of
regulations, on the other hand, seems to attract those desperate
to create a child. Above all, countries should protect gamete
donors, recipients, and children born as a result of ART. While
supply hindrance laws and recipient discrimination regulations
might have negative consequences, reasonable health regu-
lations must be enforced.
A. ANONYMITY AND PAYMENT: INFRINGING THE RIGHTS OF
GAMETE DONORS, LEGAL PARENTS, OR CHILDREN
Before strategizing how gamete trade might safely and
more efficiently operate, it is important to address at least two
bioethical questions. First, is the commodification of gametes
morally corrupt? Second, does a child, gamete recipient, or
donor have a right to know the identity of the other parties?
Recall that national policies that restrict donor compensation
and prevent anonymity tend to lessen donors' willingness to
supply their genetic material for ART purposes. 29 States will
hopefully forgo enactment of supply hindrance laws upon
realizing that the interests of donors, ART recipients, and the
resulting child greatly outweigh any moral or legal rights
allegedly violated by compensation and donor anonymity.
Accordingly, gamete supplies will increase, and recipients will
have the opportunity to more readily acquire gametes within
their own country.
1. Compensating Gamete Donors is Acceptable
As noted earlier, empirical evidence suggests that gamete
donors are enticed by financial compensation, and as a result,
126. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 80-82.
128. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text describing countries that
forbid the use of fresh gametes, donor gametes or surgically-obtained sperm.
129. See supra Part I.C.
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states that do not pay donors are more likely to suffer from
sperm and egg shortages.'13 This causal relationship is repeated
internationally.13' But is the effectiveness of a donor-paid
system, which is said to treat gametes like commodities,
outweighed by ethical concerns?
131
The free alienability argument advanced by Kenneth Baum
and others is premised on the open-ended concept of "pro-
creative liberty.""3 In the words of John Robertson, procreative
liberty is the freedom either to have children or avoid having
them.3 It is a negative right, meaning that the government
and persons have a duty not to interfere with procreative
choice.' 35 Robertson asserts that the "presumptive primacy of
procreative liberty sets a very high standard for limiting those
rights, tilting the balance in favor of reproducing but not totally
determining its acceptability."13' Those who want to regulate
procreative choice therefore bear the burden of showing that the
harms associated with ART override potential parents' liberty
interest.
37
Robertson's stringent test, which places the burden of proof
on opponents of evolving ART to demonstrate its dangerousness
130. See Baum, supra note 3, at 159-60; see also supra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text.
131. Consider sperm and egg shortages in Israel and Victoria, Australia, where
donor compensation is banned. Short supplies in the United Kingdom under the
HFEA and Canada under the AHRA provide two additional examples. See supra
Part I.C.1.
132. Although the focus of this Note is global trade implications, ethical issues
are unavoidable in such a highly controversial field as assisted reproduction. Ethics
tend to influence policy and law, which is why bioethical issues are worth exploring
here. For an excellent discussion of biomedical issues surrounding gamete trade, as
well as policy proposals that might reconcile ethical concerns, see generally
Pennings, supra note 44.
133. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
134. John Robertson, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22-26, 29-34 (1994), reprinted in MICHAEL SHAPIRO
ET AL., BIOETHICS AND LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 543-47 (2003).
135. It is not a right against private interference, nor is it a positive right to
have the government or persons provide the means or resources necessary to have or
avoid having children. See id. at 22-26, 29-34.
136. See id. Robertson points out that all individuals have a right to procreate,
whether through coital or non-coital reproduction using ART. Id. at 33-34.
Robertson's claim differs from the U.S. Supreme Court in this way; the Court draws
the right to procreate from the sanctity of marriage and privacy in the bedroom. See
id. Robertson contends that "infertility should no more disqualify [coitally infertile
couples] from reproductive experiences than physical disability should disqualify
persons from walking with mechanical assistance." Id.
137. See id.
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versus on proponents to demonstrate its safety, seems to have it
backwards. Imagine what might happen if the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration applied Robertson's philosophy: wonder
cures would infiltrate the marketplace unless someone came
forward with evidence that the drug is a disaster. The danger
exists for ART as well; surely the evolving medical procedures of
assisted reproduction are fraught with health risks that con-
senting patients might trivialize in their quest to become par-
ents. An unbridled, laissez-faire schematic might jeopardize the
safety of the initial participants even though they are exercising
their procreative liberty.
However, in the context of international gamete trade,
Robertson's approach reigns supreme. Paying gamete donors is
not inappropriate because financial incentives increase supply
and thus access to gametes, which in turn enables ART-seeking
individuals to safely exercise their inherent right to procreate.'
Using governmental powers to prevent donors from being comp-
ensated is wrong when the regulations interfere with pro-
creative liberty;3 9 the danger of donor compensation violating
moral values, while an important philosophical issue, is a spec-
ulative harm for society that does not outweigh the choice to
procreate. Also, the meaning of what is ethical sways with the
political pendulum. Thus, government's limited responsibility
should be to impose and enforce health guidelines on fertility cli-
nics, which would diminish the danger to public safety.
Another line of arguments against the sale of human
gametes is founded on abstract ethical concerns that gamete
trade is wrong because gametes are part of the human body, and
human body parts should not be assigned a monetary value and
sold like ordinary goods.14° This argument is said to be valid
even though gametes are renewable, like hair and fingernails,
as opposed to kidneys or other organs."'
138. See id. Because this Note focuses on international gamete trade, the debate
between bioethicists is only briefly stated. Other articles providing much greater
insight into this debate should be consulted. See, e.g., id.
139. Shanley suggests that gametes are not owned but rather "held in common
with past and future generations." See Shanley, supra note 17, at 273 (quoting
Donna Dickenson, Procuring Gametes for Research and Therapy: The Argument for
Unisex Altruism--a Response to Donald Evans, J. MED. ETHICS, 92-95 (2002)). This
argument has persuaded policy makers to forbid the sale of transplant organs. But
see generally Baum, supra note 3 (debunking the similarities between organ and
gamete trade).
140. Shanley, supra note 17, at 272-73.
141. See Baum, supra note 3, at 127. Baum argues that sperm and eggs are
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It is true that human eggs and sperm are not like ordinary
goods because gametes can be used to create another living
being. However, if legislators accept that procreative liberty is
important and must not be interrupted absent compelling just-
ification,12 the interests of hypothetically impoverished gamete
donors, as well as the interests of ART-conceived children, do
not outweigh the deeply-rooted right of adults to reproduce as
they desire. Furthermore, the fact that human gametes are
renewable suggests that donors do not sacrifice their own repro-
ductive capacity, nor should the human gamete market be reg-
ulated to the same extent as human organ exchanges. Ethical
concerns against gamete commodification, therefore, are out-
weighed by the tangible benefit of an accessible reproductive
market.
2. To Be or Not To Be Anonymous: That Is the Choice
Some parents want their child to know that she is only
partially biologically related, while other parents keep ART a
secret. A parent who tells his or her child may also encourage
or allow the child to communicate with her donor, whereas ano-
ther parent may choose not to reveal the donor's identity even if
the parent knows such information. In the latter situation, can
the child conceived through ART invoke a legal right to know
his donor's identity? In the United States, the answer is no, due
to a paucity of legislation on the subject.
In contrast to the United States, citizens of other countries
may invoke a legal right to know a donor's identity. It is dif-
ficult to prove that the impetus behind anti-anonymity laws in
foreign countries is a fundamental human right to know one's
genetic progenitor. Rather, the justification appears to be based
on ethical grounds and perhaps assumptions about the psych-
both renewable. Id. A woman is born with 400,000 eggs but loses approximately
five hundred through menstruation during her life. Id. at 127-28 (citation omitted).
While her supply of eggs is not literally renewed in the sense of new cell creation,
the quantity of eggs is never naturally exhausted.
142. See generally supra note 83 (cases finding procreation a right).
143. If empirical research can establish some concrete harm to children born of
ART, then that might outweigh the interests of procreative liberty. For instance,
some studies estimate that two percent of children conceived by IVF are born with
birth defects. However, that estimate must be compared to the general rate of birth
defects for natural pregnancies. The same comparison must be made for potential
psychological harms.
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ological frailty of children who never learn their donor's name.
While well-intentioned, laws that require donors to reveal not
just their medical history but also the donor's name have
deterred donors who wish to remain anonymous, thus having a
negative effect on gamete supplies and access. 4 5
Anti-anonymity laws hinder open reproductive markets and
lack a solid justification. First, children do not have a fund-
amental right to know the exact name of the person from whom
their genetic material originated. If governments recognized
this right, anonymously giving one's child up for adoption would
be illegal. 146 Nor do gamete recipients have a right to know the
name or identifying information about the donor. The interests
of recipients and ART-conceived children can be just as easily
met by acquiring detailed medical histories, as well as physical
or aptitude descriptions of the donor. Otherwise, the recipient
should only buy gametes from a donor willing to reveal his
identity.147  Lastly, donors who feel they have a right to be
known by the child they helped create can meet their goal by
contracting for such rights or donating at a clinic that discloses
such information to the child. In essence, no party of ART has a
fundamental or insurmountable interest in exposing the donor's
identity. Because laws that prevent donor anonymity hinder
gamete supplies, free trade and procreative liberty, the choice of
anonymity should be left to the donor or negotiated by donors
and recipients.
144. See supra notes 67-68.
145. See supra Part I.C.2.
146. For policy reasons, namely the endangerment of unwanted children, such a
law should never pass. Laws and programs allowing anonymous abandonment exist
in the United States and abroad, including France. See generally Adoption Network
Law Center's homepage, http://www.adoptioninformation.com (last visited Sept. 16,
2005). These laws permit mothers to leave their babies at "safe havens" versus risk
unsafely abandoning their children elsewhere. Id. The mothers suffer no criminal
or civil penalties. Id.
147. It may so happen that for some potential parents, no accessible donor is
willing to disclose his or her identity. The potential parent will not be forced to give
up on having a child; instead, he or she may choose to wait for the right donor to
come along. Otherwise-unless gametes are not being donated for other reasons-
there would still be access to sperm or eggs in case the potential parent decides to
settle for an anonymous donor. The opposite law, requiring donor identity
disclosure, would decrease gamete supplies so that the resource is not available for
anyone.
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B. THE PROS AND CONS OF "PROCREATIVE TOURISM"
Potential parents have an interest in obtaining gametes
when and from whom they desire. Rather than wait years to ac-
quire a gamete from the perfect local donor, couples and single
adults increasingly turn to the international market for im-
mediate satisfaction.18 This might entail traveling to another
state or purchasing gametes online.9 The drawbacks over-
shadow the benefits of this market system.
1. Advantages
Advantages of resorting to another country are more
relevant in situations where the hopeful recipient would not
otherwise be entitled to buy or secure a third-party gamete.
France, Italy, and Germany are among the countries with reci-
pient discrimination laws based on age, sexual preference,
and/or marital status.5 ° Although some regulations are founded
on legitimate health concerns, such as the inherent dangers of
an older woman bearing children,15' most restrictions appear to
derive from strong ethical opposition. Homosexual couples
buying donor eggs or sperm, for instance, might be banned to
prevent the creation of 'untraditional' families.' When denied
access to their local market, infertile or single-sex couples
determined to exercise their procreative liberties have no
alternative but the international market, so it is beneficial that
one exists. Note, however, that disenfranchised adults would be
less reliant on distant sources (if at all) if ethics-based trade
regulations did not block access to affordable gametes at home.
Sperm banks, fertility clinics, and gamete donors financially
benefit from international trade. 53  This holds most true for
providers located in countries with less restrictive trade rules,
such as the United States, because clients from around the
world flock to these providers when local gamete access or
148. See supra Part I.D.
149. See, e.g., supra note 60 (regarding Dutch gamete purchasers).
150. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., supra note 77 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., supra note 74 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 20 (providing an example of a dealer of gametes in
Denmark); supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting international trade in
gametes is a multi-billion dollar industry); supra note 55 (providing an example of a
dealer of gametes in the United States); supra note 53 (providing an example of a
dealer of gametes in India).
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supply is obstructed. Attracting a greater number of clients
thus stimulates the providers' economies by creating jobs and
generating income for gamete clinics and donors. From a free
trade perspective, the creation of businesses to meet demand
seems to be economically logical and desirable.
A third advantage of procreative tourism is that the
necessity of transporting gametes to non-local recipients has
fostered technological and medical progress. The need to ship
gametes to a recipient who lives on another continent, for
instance, has encouraged experts to learn more about preserving
human cells and creating transport containers that meet that
end.154 This knowledge is likely to assist in other important me-
dical fields, such as the transport of human organs.
2. Disadvantages
Aside from ethics debates over the commodification of
gametes, purchase of gametes or ART services between
countries frustrates politicians and agency officials whose reg-
ulations are circumvented. Disenfranchised men and women
invariably return to their countries after receiving ART services
on their own terms, yet few if any states enact measures to
punish border crossers. Indeed, past events and current Euro-
pean treaties reveal that politicians are practically helpless to
take action. 15 5 For instance, around the year 1990, German bor-
der guards forced gynecological examinations upon women re-
entering Germany at the Dutch border in search of evidence of
abortions, a medical practice Germany forbade by law.5 6 Pros-
ecutors brought criminal charges against women who obtained
abortions in other countries.' The European parliament con-
demned Germany's examination practices in 1991.158
Competitive international gamete commerce also has draw-
154. See supra notes 19-20 (describing how sperm can be transported in liquid
nitrogen tanks and remain viable).
155. Presently, Articles 50 and 60 of the European Community Treaty
guarantee the free movement of services, including medical services and thus
infertility treatment, which implies that people have the right under community law
to go to another country and receive the service they desire. Pennings, supra note
44, at 339.
156. Id. at 339 (citing S.F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law:
Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American
Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 458 (1992)).
157. Id. at 339.
158. Id.
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
backs for buyers who must expend travel or importation costs.
The same expenses may also prevent less wealthy people from
obtaining gametes from the country and donor of their choice, or
else require that money be saved for years while the potential
parents grow older. In light of the fact that only thirty-four per-
cent of all ART procedures are typically successfUl,"5 spending
so much money substantially raises the stakes. Also, one can
easily imagine the added stress of having to return to a distant
clinic for repeat treatments. 6 ° If ART is a gamble anywhere, it
becomes an even greater risk when attempted globally.
Furthermore, companies that export human sperm or eggs
are obligated to invest in technology and equipment that pre-
serves the specimen until it reaches its destination. Main-
taining the latest, most innovative technology requires a large
on-going capital investment that may force smaller gamete
suppliers out of business. 161 The solution is likely to be consoli-
dation, a chain of "McGametes" that are incorporated in legally
favorable-i.e., less regulated-countries like the United States.
Further economic analysis of consolidated industries with few
competing businesses is beyond the scope of this Note. Suffice it
to say, present ethical justifications against gamete commodi-
fication may be just the tip of the iceberg.
C. THE OPTION OF INTERNET TRADE UNDERCUTS TRADE
REGULATIONS
The potential for unsafe Internet trade is one more reason
to ensure local gamete supply and accessibility. As noted above,
no health agency exists to screen World Wide Web donors, and
countries are finding it difficult to interject their own safety reg-S162
ulations across cyberspace. As a result, people who meet
online can exchange human gametes on their own terms with no
159. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
160. Admittedly, not every overseas fertility treatment is a hassle. An exception
might be spouses of those employed overseas on military duty or when one of the
potential parents is a native of the destination country. Some U.S. Navy wives have
flocked to countries such as Columbia, France, Belgium, South Africa, Malaysia and
Singapore for IVF. See Lee, supra note 15.
161. This has already become a reality; it is less common for doctors' offices in
the United States to provide their own eggs or sperm for reproductive purposes.
Instead, they often obtain gametes from the large suppliers. See 69 Fed. Reg.
29,786, 29,819 (proposed May 25, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210-11, 820,
1271).
162. See supra Part I.D.
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oversight. 63 However, to utilize the gametes, the recipient will
probably consult a fertility clinic that imposes government stan-
dards.
6 4
Countries must acknowledge how the Internet has become a
means of evading gamete trade regulations. All three gamete
trade law categories can be avoided through Internet trade.
First, supply hindrance laws are easily circumvented. Donors
who wish to financially benefit from their reproductive cells,
remain anonymous, or continue providing sperm or eggs despite
sire quotas can simply advertise online. The Internet connects
the donor with multitudes of interested recipients. The only
obstacle is finding an Internet-based trade company, which
governments have difficulty regulating,65 to coordinate logis-
tics. Second, recipient discrimination laws are avoided in much
the same way: homosexuals, unmarried individuals, and those
whose age would preclude them from local ART are free to shop
online for donors and clinicians. Finally, health regulations
may perhaps be avoided by soliciting gamete providers in coun-
tries with more favorable laws. For instance, citizens of France
can shop online for fresh gametes instead of obtaining the frozen
variety available within the country.66 It is unclear, in each of
these situations, whether the regulations of the recipient's coun-
try or the donor's country apply. One might assume that regu-
lations will be enforced where ART services are obtained, since
fertility clinics are typically subject to government oversight.
However, it is possible that clinics would not refuse patients
who obtained gametes through alternative means such as the
Internet, so long as the clinic did not participate in the activity
163. Of course, transportation of the gametes poses a problem, and eggs cannot
be extracted without medical assistance. Hypothetically, however, a sperm donor
might use overnight or priority mail to send his cells to a recipient he met online.
The receiving woman might introduce the sperm to her body without medical
assistance.
164. One might argue that the consequence of Internet gamete trade is not so
different from having sexual intercourse with a stranger met online in hopes of
impregnation, though intimate physical contact obviously differs from an arms-
length business transaction. In both cases the Internet brought the donor and
recipient together, and the gametes are not screened for the recipient's welfare. The
parties might even cross state or national borders to meet. To interfere with the
ingenuity of recipients avoiding coital reproduction, therefore, is a pointless battle
that misses the big picture: if governments attempt to regulate Internet gamete
exchanges, people will meet in person or find another way. Internet laws will
become just another inconvenience.
165. See supra Part I.D.
166. See Pennings, supra note 44, at 338; supra Part I.C.3.
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and the proferred gametes pass health screenings.
Suppose for a moment that the World Trade Organization
(WTO) created an Internet regulating authority. People are un-
likely to object to health and safety oversight of Internet gamete
trade because such laws protect public welfare. Internet reg-
ulation might also prove collateral: potential parents who enlist
online donors are likely to consult a fertility clinic for complex
ART procedures, and the clinic would inevitably follow
government-imposed safety regulations. Opposition might
surface, however, if the potential Internet oversight authority
imposed either gamete supply hindering or recipient
discrimination laws.167 The existence of such laws might result
from political pressures, though it might be difficult for
countries to reconcile necessary regulations and enforcement
mechanisms. The concept of international oversight will soon be
explored in more detail.
D. FREE MARKET INCENTIVES: WHY THE U.S. MODEL IS BEST
1. Allowing Profit from Gamete Sales is Beneficial
One critical distinction between the United States' gamete
trade and other countries is that U.S. donors experience no
limits to compensation. Donors are more than reimbursed for
personal expenses; they make a profit. It is not unreasonable to
believe that fewer U.S. residents would donate gametes for use
by strangers if the financial incentive disappeared. The Pres-
ident's Council on Bioethics even concedes that monetary gain is
imbedded in the U.S. gamete trade culture, though the Council
prefers uncompensated donation.
16
The number of donations from individuals with popular
traits, such as a clean family health history, might decline if
donor compensation were limited. Rather than buy out the
highest quality donor, potential parents will have to accept what
is available based on a limited supply of selfless donors. Variety
of donors might also decrease. In essence, certain types of
gametes might become more difficult to obtain if financial incen-
tives are eliminated. Because enticing donors with monetary
167. See Introduction supra Part II for an explanation of three proposed trade
law categories.
168. See supra note 88.
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incentives, which the United States does not regulate, can help
to avoid gamete shortages and narrow selections, the U.S model
of compensating donors is preferable.
2. Donor Anonymity as a Market Incentive
Under the U.S. model, donor anonymity is optional. No reg-
ulation dictates this outcome; free enterprise controls. Entre-
preneurial donors will disclose many details to attract potential
buyers and perhaps make greater profit.16 9 Anonymous donors
divulge minimal identifying information to avoid future legal
and emotional responsibilities. Either way, the U.S. market ca-
ters to the diverse desires of its own population and those
abroad.
Sperm banks in the United States "have a lot to lose should
donor anonymity become threatened."7 °  Recent disclosure
trends in European countries reveal that men are less willing to
donate sperm if their identity will not be shielded. Some sperm
donors might be persuaded to forgo a secret identity in ex-
change for higher compensation. In countries where profit-
making gamete sales are banned, however, there may be less
incentive to donate.
E. MARKET ALTERNATIVES: WTO/GATT REGULATION
So far the WTO has not attempted to create a treaty that
imposes the same human gamete trade regulations on all coun-
tries. It is not difficult to understand why, given that gamete
commerce touches upon controversial, bioethical issues. The
first obstacle is to decide which standard to choose. A consensus
between nations on topics such as anonymity and donor comp-
ensation may not be easily achieved. For instance, although
most countries can agree that "respect for human dignity" and
"inviolability of the human person" are important objectives,
these principles may be "very broadly defined without checking
whether people also agree on the implications of the principles
in concrete cases."'7'
169. See supra note 118.
170. Wolff, supra note 90. Anonymity seems to be less controversial with egg
donors, since their identity is more often disclosed.
171. Pennings, supra note 44, at 339. "[Tlhe European Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine is an indirect attempt to reduce diversity and to standardise
legislation around a set of moral rules about which there was never a consensus to
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A WTO directive would not succeed in enabling people to
buy reproductive cells within their own countries unless full-
scale regulations are implemented to coordinate gamete trade.
It will not suffice that more people are granted equal access to
third-party gametes, for instance, unless countries can offer
donors incentives to donate, such as profits or the choice of an-
onymity. Otherwise, demand would surpass supply. Further-
more, under the same rubric, the WTO must not cap donor com-
pensation or dictate anonymity rules without accounting for a
reduction in gamete donations, which would impact access-
ibility.
Hypothetical WTO pact aside, it is important for
policymakers in each country to anticipate and analyze the con-
sequences of regulating gamete donors or recipients. Infertile
individuals, same-sex couples, and others who wish to fill a nur-
sery occupy every corner of human civilization. Willingness to
donate eggs or sperm for ART purposes also crosses national
boundaries. Every country must decide to what extent it will
regulate the attainment and donation of gametes. These count-
ries should ultimately conclude that a health conscious, open
reproductive market strikes a fair balance between government
control, ethics, and reproductive freedom.
CONCLUSION
When gamete trade is interrupted by supply hindrance and
recipient discrimination laws, hopeful parents resort to the
international economy, including the Internet. Free trade of
gametes has proven more effective than domestic regulation in
satisfying increasing demand for human eggs and sperm for
ART purposes. Employing the U.S. model of independent clinic
regulation and federally regulated health standards will attract
a greater diversity of donors and satisfy the needs of recipients.
Ultimately, international gamete trade should be a choice, not a
last resort.
start with." Id.
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